

Mathematical model of computer viruses



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


- Models of computation
- Operating system
- Virus definition
- What can we do with this mathematical model ?






Finite automata






Finite automata




Input tape







Finite automata




Output tape



Input tape





Turing Machine $T = \langle Q, S, I, \delta, b, q_0, q_f \rangle$ S: tape symbolsI: input symbols, $I \subset S$ b: blank symbol, $b \in S \setminus I$ δ : move function, $\delta: Q \times S \rightarrow Q \times S \times \{1, r, s\}$
























RASPM with ABS definition


 $G = \langle V, U, T, f, q, M \rangle$




M: initial memory content q: initial value of the IP $f: U \rightarrow T$ T: set of processor's activities U: operation codes, $U \subseteq V$ V: set of symbols

Instruction set


- move (LOAD, STORE)
- logical (AND, OR, XOR)
- arithmetic (ADD, SUB, MULT, DIV)
- branch (JUMP, JGTZ, JZERO)
- input/output tape handling (READ, WRITE)
- background tape handling (GET, PUT, SEEK, SETDRIVE)



Operating System



- system of programs
- able to handle separate program or data files
- able to make a specified program to run.







• The OS is in the initial memory (M)



The OS is in the initial memory (M)
 → OS specific machine



The OS is in the initial memory (M)
→ OS specific machine
The OS is in the background tape




The OS is in the initial memory (M)

→ OS specific machine

The OS is in the background tape

→ OS independent machine




The OS is in the initial memory (M)

→ OS specific machine

The OS is in the background tape

→ OS independent machine

The OS is in the input tape



The OS is in the initial memory (M)

→ OS specific machine

The OS is in the background tape

→ OS independent machine

The OS is in the input tape

→ unusable



Comparing **RASPM** with ABS-es $G_1 = \langle V_1, U_1, T_1, f_1, q_1, M_1 \rangle$ $G_2 = \langle V_2, U_2, T_2, f_2, g_2, M_2 \rangle$ $\{q_{1}, M_{1}\} \neq \{q_{2}, M_{2}\}$



Comparing **RASPM** with ABS-es $G_1 = \langle V_1, U_1, T_1, f_1, q_1, M_1 \rangle$ $G_2 = \langle V_2, U_2, T_2, f_2, g_2, M_2 \rangle$ $\{q_{1}, M_{1}\} \neq \{q_{2}, M_{2}\}$



different operating systems
different loader program



Comparing **RASPM** with ABS-es $G_1 = \langle V_1, U_1, T_1, f_1, q_1, M_1 \rangle$ $G_2 = \langle V_2, U_2, T_2, f_2, g_2, M_2 \rangle$ $\{f_1, T_1, U_1\} \neq \{f_2, T_2, U_2\}$



Comparing **RASPM** with ABS-es $G_1 = \langle V_1, U_1, T_1, f_1, q_1, M_1 \rangle$ $G_2 = \langle V_2, U_2, T_2, f_2, g_2, M_2 \rangle$ $\{ f_{1}, T_{1}, U_{1} \} \neq \{ f_{2}, T_{2}, U_{2} \}$



different instruction sets (activities)
different sets of operation codes
different operation codes





 $V_1 \neq V_2$





different symbols
different tape formats

 $V_1 \neq V_2$




• a (part of) program






• a (part of) program

it is attached to a program area



- a (part of) program
- it is attached to a program area
- it is able to link itself to other program areas



- a (part of) program
- it is attached to a program area
- it is able to link itself to other program areas
- it is executed when the host program area is to be executed







machine specific

Hungarian Virus Buster

machine specific
machine independent



- machine specific
- machine independent
- operating system specific




- machine specific
- machine independent
- operating system specific
- operating system independent



- machine specific
- machine independent
- operating system specific
- operating system independent
- direct



- machine specific
- machine independent
- operating system specific
- operating system independent
- direct
- indirect







Examining virus detection problem



Examining virus detection problem
Examining searching techniques




- Examining virus detection problem
- Examining searching techniques
- Examining polymorphic viruses



- Examining virus detection problem
- Examining searching techniques
- Examining polymorphic viruses
- Examining multiplatform viruses

Theorem:



It is impossible to build a Turing Machine which could decide if an executable file in a RASPM with ABS contains a virus or not.

Proof:

Host program Virus


Hungarian

Proof:

Host program Virus TM prg


Hungarian

Proof:





 Host program
 Virus
 TM prg
 TM input

Proof:



 Host program
 Virus
 TM prg
 TM input








"An anti-virus has its limit, thanks to Turing, and a virus can find those limits, exploit them, thanks to Darwin."

from the Giant Black Book of Computer Viruses






For what kind of viruses can be used ?



- For what kind of viruses can be used ?
- What is the probability of false alarms ?



- For what kind of viruses can be used ?
- What is the probability of false alarms ?
- What is the expense criteria ?

Sequence searching algorithm





for non-polymorphic known viruses

Sequence searching algorithm

L: size of suspicious area M: number of sequences N: size of a sequence n: number of values in one cell



• for non-polymorphic known viruses • false alarms: $p \approx \frac{L \cdot M}{n}$

Sequence searching algorithm

L: size of suspicious area M: number of sequences N: size of a sequence n: number of values in one cell



• for non-polymorphic known viruses • false alarms: $p \approx \frac{L \cdot M}{n^N}$

• expense criteria: P, polynomial $\leq L \cdot M \cdot N$ comparisions



for known viruses



for known viruses


• expense criteria:





for known viruses

expense criteria: NP



How can we measure the power of polymorphism ?




How can we measure the power of polymorphism ?




Host program

Decoder

Body



full size of the virus



$\alpha = \frac{\text{size of variable parts of the virus}}{\text{full size of the virus}}$

$\mathbf{3} = \mathbf{number}$ of variants of the decoders




search for an uninfected program




search for an uninfected program

append virus



search for an uninfected program

appen'd virus



choose a random instruction in the virus





appen'd virus


choose a random instruction in the virus

swap with the next instruction










Name: Aliases: Status: Origin: Length: Infect: Other:

RIPPER **Jack Ripper** Common Norway **1024 bytes (2 sectors) MBR**, Boot sector **Resident**, Stealth, **Disk corruption**




Name: Aliases: Status: Origin: Length: Infect: Other:

RIPPER **Jack Ripper** Common Norway 1024 bytes (2 sectors) **MBR, Boot sector Resident**, Stealth, **Disk corruption**




The virus swaps two words in the DOS write buffer. It occurs on a random basis of approximately 1 write in 1024 cases.






Conditions: $V_1 \oslash U_2 \neq 0$ $U_1 \oslash V_2 \neq 0$

G₁ has to know some operation codes of G₂ G₂ has to know some operation codes of G₁



Conditions: $U_1 \gg U_2 \neq 0$ - The virus code can be the same.

 $\overline{U}_{1} \stackrel{\text{M}}{\to} \overline{U}_{2} = 0$



Conditions: $U_1 \gg U_2 \neq 0$ - The virus code can be the same.

- The virus code must be different.

